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Home :: Archive :: 1995 :: August ::
Re: Shakespeare as Bultural Construct
Shakespeare Electronic Conference, Vol. 6, No. 0604.  Thursday, 3 August 1995.
 
(1)     From:   Bill McRae <
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        Date:   Wednesday, 02 Aug 1995 14:23:57 -0500 (CDT)
        Subj:   Re: SHK 6.0598  Re: Shakespeare as Cultural Construct
 
(2)     From:   W.L. Godshalk <
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        Date:   Wednesday, 02 Aug 1995 15:49:17 -0500 (EST)
        Subj:   Re: SHK 6.0598  Re: Shakespeare as Cultural Construct
 
 
(1)----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From:           Bill McRae <
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Date:           Wednesday, 02 Aug 1995 14:23:57 -0500 (CDT)
Subject: 6.0598  Re: Shakespeare as Cultural Construct
Comment:        Re: SHK 6.0598  Re: Shakespeare as Cultural Construct
 
In reply to Bruce Young's recent posting, the subject of reflexivity is
exhaustively discussed in Malcolm Ashmore's *The Refelexive Thesis*.  For
Ashmore (and others such as Barbara Herrnstein Smith in *Contingencies of
Value* and Richard Rorty in *Continegency, Irony, and Solidarity*) reflexivity
is not an epistemological problem so much as the ground of knowledge itself.
 
 
(2)----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From:           W.L. Godshalk <
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Date:           Wednesday, 02 Aug 1995 15:49:17 -0500 (EST)
Subject: 6.0598  Re: Shakespeare as Cultural Construct
Comment:        Re: SHK 6.0598  Re: Shakespeare as Cultural Construct
 
Bruce Young discusses the "inescapable terms in which we see and understand"
with some skepticism, and I would like to add to that skepticism.  Steven
Pinker in his chapter "Mentalese" in THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT gives reasons for
believing that we do not think in any language; we think in mentalese and then
translate into a language.  If this is true, and Pinker gives strong reasons
for this hypothesis, then our thinking can NOT be dominated by language, by
"inescapable terms." We may rather say that the expression of our thinking is
colored by the language that we select to use -- since many of us have the
choice.
 
Yours, Bill Godshalk
 

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