Subscribe to Our Feeds

Current Postings RSS

Announcements RSS

Home ::
Shakespeare the Grain-Dealing Tax Evader

 

The Shakespeare Conference: SHK 24.0212  Saturday, 4 May 2013

 

[Editor’s Note: The “Shakespeare the Grain-Dealing Tax Evader” (Businessman) Thread has taken off into several directions, some of which seem to me not to be useful to pursue. I will allow another round or two of the Businessman portion. However, if you wish to continue discussing any of the other topics (such as “Coal-Fog-Smog”) that have been included under this rubric, please do so by submitting them with a Subject that describes accurately that topic. –Hardy]

 

[1] From:        John Briggs < This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it >

     Date:         April 26, 2013 9:40:31 AM EDT

     Subject:     Re: SHAKSPER: Businessman 

 

[2] From:        Clark J. Holloway < This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it >

     Date:         April 26, 2013 1:02:48 PM EDT

     Subject:     Re: SHAKSPER: Businessman 

 

[3] From:        Larry Weiss < This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it >

     Date:         April 26, 2013 2:43:24 PM EDT

     Subject:     Re: SHAKSPER: Businessman 

 

[4] From:        Tony Burton < This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it >

     Date:         April 27, 2013 11:27:13 AM EDT

     Subject:     Re: SHAKSPER:  Businessman 

 

 

[1]-----------------------------------------------------------------

From:        John Briggs < This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it >

Date:         April 26, 2013 9:40:31 AM EDT

Subject:     Re: SHAKSPER: Businessman

 

Larry Weiss wrote:

 

> Wasn’t the reviewer Eric Sams, who provided both the forward 

> and an essay published in your treatise?

 

I’m sure Michael Egan will say that you’ve got that backwards . . . 

 

John Briggs

 

[2]-------------------------------------------------------------

From:        Clark J. Holloway < This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it >

Date:         April 26, 2013 1:02:48 PM EDT

Subject:     Re: SHAKSPER: Businessman

 

PS: Regarding an aside in my last post:

 

>(though I did find a site that gave a Catalan definition of “caliban” 

>as “moon”)

 

I recalled after firing off my last missive that a number of the moons orbiting the planet Uranus have been named after Shakespearean characters, so I checked and find that indeed, one of the lesser moons of Uranus has been named Caliban, which explains the rather abbreviated “definition” I found above. 

 

Which, BTW, makes me think that if Mr. Roe did find some European dialect where the word “caliban” means “outcast” or “pariah,” that the word probably derived from the Shakespearean usage, and not the other way around. If you look up “caliban” in an English dictionary you’ll find that one of the definitions is “a brutal or brutalized man” and that the term is taken from the name of Shakespeare’s character.

 

[3]-------------------------------------------------------------

From:        Larry Weiss < This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it >

Date:         April 26, 2013 2:43:24 PM EDT

Subject:     Re: SHAKSPER: Businessman

 

>“Upon the foggie air . . . ” describes the pollution in vivid imagery. 

 

How is this? Fog and smog are entirely different phenomena. Fog is a natural phenomenon, occurring over coastal areas whenever air and water temperatures and wind speed and direction are right. The burning of fossil fuels neither produces nor inhibits fog. There would be fog over the Thames estuary even if there were no city there.

 

[4]-------------------------------------------------------------

From:        Tony Burton < This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it >

Date:         April 27, 2013 11:27:13 AM EDT

Subject:     Re: SHAKSPER:  Businessman

 

In pointing out the business realities underlying Shakespeare’s investment/gamble in purchasing/hoarding corn, Larry Weiss has said something with which I can at last agree wholeheartedly. Along with the grasshopper and ant to which Larry refers, I think of Joseph interpreting Pharaoh’s dream of seven fat and seven lean kine, as it led to wise preparation for times of dearth and won him royal favor for a valuable service.  

 

Why can we not put Shakespeare in this context, rather than picturing him as the market-cornering villain suggested by the apparent fact that he violated an anti-hoarding law—one that may well have been misguided, misapplied, or corruptly diverted for the benefit of royal favorites—by planning ahead? Do we know that he actually profiteered from excessively high prices when the time came for him to sell? I’d like to know.  

 

Further, might he not even have distributed his grain at a charitably modest price, acting like Pharaoh as the guardian of his community’s welfare? A good many lawbreakers are also culture heroes, though I don’t think Shakespeare was a Robin Hood. Yet he had an admirable reputation in London for a sort of easy gentility, of a nature that makes the image of a market-cornering profiteer in Stratford notably incongruent. The devil is once again lurking in the details, and that is where the exorcists should direct their searching.

 

Fiat lux,

Tony Burton 

 
 
Greenblatt’s Freedom

 

The Shakespeare Conference: SHK 24.0211  Saturday, 4 May 2013

 

[1] From:        Will Sharpe < This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it >

     Date:         April 27, 2013 12:51:24 AM EDT

     Subject:     Re: SHAKSPER: Greenblatt’s Freedom 

 

[2] From:        Ira Zinlaw < This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it >

     Date:         April 29, 2013 9:44:21 PM EDT

     Subject:     Re: SHAKSPER: Greenblatt’s Freedom SONNET 148

 

 

[1]-----------------------------------------------------------------

From:        Will Sharpe < This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it >

Date:         April 27, 2013 12:51:24 AM EDT

Subject:     Re: SHAKSPER: Greenblatt’s Freedom

 

Greenblatt’s Freedom

 

I think there are a few crossed wires here though I think the right reading has been proposed between them. David Bishop says:

 

>The last two lines could be 

>paraphrased: Or if the eyes of love have correspondence with 

>true sight, my judgment falsely censures my love for being 

>unbeautiful. 

 

John Crowley then claims to agree with Larry Weiss (who disagrees with Bishop) saying:

 

The lines open by saying that love has put eyes in the poet’s head that have no correspondence with true sight—i.e. that see as beautiful what is actually ugly. (“If hairs be wires, black wires grow on her head” etc.) Then the opposite is posited: maybe my new eyes DO have correspondence with true sight, and what I see as beautiful IS beautiful, and it’s my judgment that has “fled away” and judges (falsely) as ugly what they see as beautiful.

 

I think John actually is agreeing with David, and if I may propose a reading of David's paraphrase, I think what he means when he says 'for' is actually 'as'. 'For' gives the impression that the object of love is objectively ugly, but I think he meant to convey the sense of a false interpretation on the part of the poet's judgement. He goes on to say:

 

>The oddness of saying that “censure falsely” 

>means “regard as beautiful” might warn us off this interpretation, 

>though perhaps an attraction to the esoteric can override the 

>warning.

>I wonder if others agree. 

 

I do. I think ‘censure falsely’ means what both David and John are suggesting, albeit that I think David’s unintentionally slippery preposition caused confusion. The reading of ‘censure falsely’ as ‘regard as beautiful’ makes no sense to me. The judgement has obviously fled because it’s not there to tell him that the person is ugly (all he can see is his/her beauty), but even if it were it would be wrong (because it has been established by the hypothetical proposition that his eyes DO objectively have correspondence with true sight).

 

Of course Greenblatt is right that the sense of the testimony of the eyes being contradicted is in there, but I think the way he arrives at that conclusion is a little illogical. He’s saying that it’s the judgement that is pushing the idea of the person’s beauty, and not the eyes. I imagine the way this happened is that in the course of quickly writing another extraordinarily ambitious, paradigm-shifting book he let control of one small reading among hundreds – forming an enormously broad picture – slip away from him.

 

Best,

Will

 

[2]-------------------------------------------------------------

From:        Ira Zinlaw < This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it >

Date:         April 29, 2013 9:44:21 PM EDT

Subject:     Re: SHAKSPER: Greenblatt’s Freedom SONNET 148

 

I like Tony's comment that Shakespeare makes nearly everyone look good . . . 

 

Looking at Sonnet 148, I think it is helpful to see how its following Sonnet 147, and others which precede it to shed some light on how one may interpret it.  As for me, here is my offering on it:

   

In Sonnet 147, the Poet says that “reason . . . hath left me, and I desperate now approve desire is death.” (Sonnet 147.7-8) In Sonnet 148, the Poet takes no responsibility for using free will to engage in his desires, but blames “love” for the state he is in. “What eyes hath Love put in my head.”  Who or what is this Love?

 

There are variable meanings that we look at to try and understand where the Poet takes us in Sonnet 148. If “Love” refers to The Creator, who lovingly created Man in His Image, He has indeed given us physical eyes. If one chooses to have the eyes of Sonnet 137.2, that “see not what they see” because they are “blind” (Sonnet 137.1), then they understandably may be called “false eyes.” If “Love,” in line 1, is the kind described in Sonnet 147, “my love is a fever, longing still” wherein “Love is my sin” (Sonnet 142.1), then this means love of wanton desires and worldly pleasures. In either case, whether “Love” is The Creator, or “Love” is desire for the worldly, if wrongfully used, the eyes are transferred to the “false plague” of Sonnet 137.14.

 

Finally, there is the esoteric interpretation of the physical “eyes” in line 1, which “have no correspondence with true sight.” “True sight” is spiritual vision, or intuition, which does not depend on the physical eyes.

 

Even if the eyes have the physical ability to see, the mind must be capable of discernment. “Or, if they have, where is my judgment fled, That censures falsely what they see aright?” In Sonnet 147, we read: “my reason . . . hath left me” and “my thoughts and my discourse as madmen’s are.” (Sonnet 147.5, 11) It would not be possible, if reason has departed, to determine then whether “false eyes dote” upon what is “fair.”

 

The Poet goes on to state that the world may disagree on what is “true” or “fair,” but love itself may reveal truth. “If it be not, then love doth well denote.” Perhaps true love may reveal truth, but if “love’s eye” means the “false eyes” that dote in a love-sick way, then “Love’s eye is not so true as all men’s: no. In other words, the “false eyes” that feed an “uncertain sickly appetite” (Sonnet 147.4) are not as reliable as the judgment of mankind in general, i.e. those that understand the temptations that cause one to be “vexed with watching and with tears.”

 

Even the sun’s light cannot shine until the clouds dissipate, so no wonder, says the Poet, that he is mistaken in his view of things. “No marvel then, though I mistake my view. The sun itself sees not till heaven clears.”

 

The “cunning love” that is a “fever, longing still” for that which causes “disease” is vexation, and this causes tears of sorrow. (Sonnet 142.1, 2) The “cunning love” is both the love of worldly temptations, and the “the worser spirit a woman, colour’d ill,” or the self-centered ego that tries to “corrupt my saint to be a devil.” (Sonnet 144.4, 7) Without unrelenting worldly desires, or an ego “who like a fiend” (Sonnet 145.11) “keep’st me blind,” the eyes might be “well-seeing” enough to perceive the “foul faults” of worldly entrapments.

 

*******

So Tony, and all, Shakespeare gives ample scope to allow so many interpretations . . . nearly all of which are capable of being correct . . . and always food for thought.

 

Best wishes,

Ira 

 
 
Alan Cummings Macbeth

 

The Shakespeare Conference: SHK 24.0210  Saturday, 4 May 2013

 

From:        Joseph Egert < This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it >

Date:         April 27, 2013 3:06:18 PM EDT

Subject:     Isherwood’s  MACBETH 

 

To Charles Isherwood, the text of Macbeth depicts Duncan as the “generous, responsible antithesis of the ruler that Macbeth will become.”

 

http://theater.nytimes.com/2013/04/22/theater/reviews/macbeth-with-alan-cumming-at-the-barrymore-theater.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&  

 

But is this the whole story?

 

“These hangman’s hands” of Macbeth: they are the hanged man’s hands of Cawdor. In reaping Cawdor, then sowing Macbeth in his place, Duncan has sealed his own doom. ‘Farmer’ Duncan has “hang’d himself.” In this bloody land of Fair-is-foul, instructor Duncan has “overcharg’d” his cannon Macbeth’s soul with “double cracks” and dies from the blowback.

 

Joe Egert

 
 
Knocking Pechter, Pt. 2

 

The Shakespeare Conference: SHK 24.0209  Saturday, 4 May 2013

 

From:        Gerald E. Downs < This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it >

Date:         April 26, 2013 9:04:59 PM EDT

Subject:     Knocking Pechter, Pt. 2

 

In Romanticism Lost, Pechter repeatedly asserts little will be gained by further examining the era’s textual evidence: “Given the inadequacy of the material, too much unresolvable uncertainty about too few surviving manuscripts, ‘an objective survey [. . .]’ will not by itself—that is, without evidence-exceeding hypotheses from which to proceed deductively—get us any closer to interpretive conclusions” (133). The knock on New Bibliography is that conclusions of “foul papers provenance” do exceed the evidence, whereby deduction is not yet validated. Werstine’s new book resolves quite a number of uncertainties and none of his results bode well for foul papers provenance. When Pechter approvingly cites Greg’s opinion that “plausible guessing is about all we can hope for,” he dismisses continued study of the evidence (never mind that plausible guessing often turns into insistence, such as the foul papers ‘construct,’ for which there is no worthy backing). Pechter defends a priori opinion as a kind of absolute not liable to disproof. He cites “no finite number of observations can ever justify a generalization,” which might just show McKenzie misunderstood induction and probability. Similarly, Pechter defends the New Bibliography’s much criticized “binarism” as “useful" and “necessary” (133), and he claims “there is no way to sort out the textual markings deposited by the many diverse agents . . .” (135).

 

All the foregoing seems to deny fundamentals of inquiry. Evidence and continued interpretation matter; skepticism is essential; and alternative hypotheses must be given a fair hearing. “Binary” isn’t really the best characterization of New Bibliography theory; “ternary” is better, in that the early texts of Shakespeare were supposed to be practically limited to authorized theatrical playbooks; or to Shakespeare’s working drafts (or their unguided derivatives); or to reconstructions from memory by actors (and thus removed from continued authorial influence). By these routes Shakespeare’s intentions were recoverable (observable, even), or utterly remote. They have all been subjected to meaningful criticism. Pechter voices one of the criticisms of the criticism, that

 

> “the hypothetical risk . . . seems to be realized:

> materialism as pure negativity, propelled by nothing

> beyond the desire to reiterate its own disaffection

> from literary power . . . . This extraordinary motivation,

> so I want to argue . . . has managed to install itself in

> some of the most influential centers of Shakespearean

> critical practice . . .” (84)

 

Since Werstine and McMillin are the targets of the following chapters, presumably he is speaking of them. Now if the empirical evidence has been misused someone should say so; it would be helpful at the same time to offer a better explanation of the evidence—but “purely negative” criticism is not devalued for lack of alternatives. Those can come later. Given the problems, there may be better explanations than foul papers, promptbooks, and memorial reconstructions. Werstine himself offers no specific alternatives (as I remember); maybe next time.

 

Evidence, if we take the hint, suggests transmission of Shakespeare’s plays was often radical (bad quartos are by definition memorial). Yet Pechter approvingly paraphrases Bowers on bibliographical method, “by which current editors could claim to locate authorial intentions at the start of relatively short lines of transmission” (127). We have no “starts” to analyze and problematic text indicates something other than a mere “short line” of transcription. The printed text (all the Shakespeare we got) more often than not indicates a mess at the end of the line. Scott McMillin, hardly a purely negative type in my book, takes these things into account as editor of Q1 Othello to propose a solution other than foul-paper printer’s copy. Pechter acknowledges that features of Q1 suggest (in part from F variance) a need for explanation beyond foul papers (119), and that McMillin’s hypothesis has “a marginal increase in explanatory power” (120). Yet Pechter ultimately rates it as no better than the standard assumption and by the rules of the New Bibliography, ties go to foul papers. Despite his suggestion (mistaken, in my opinion) that “wishful thinking . . . is the only kind of thinking we’ve got” (125), he does offer some real argument against McMillin. Not that he cites Q1; his is not that kind of book. I've made these arguments myself; in that sense I agree with Pechter. But there is more to the matter than wishful thinking. I’ll retrace the points to show how we may get somewhere on these doubtful cases.

 

McMillin proposes that Q1 Othello is printed from copy dictated to a scribe by a whole cast shortly after learning their lines to formulate an additional text for use as a promptbook. In my hit-and-miss manner I wrote up a shorthand hypothesis without having heard of McMillin’s edition. (I try to avoid the more difficult textual mysteries; Philaster, a cut-and-dried shorthand report, led me to revisit Othello.) But his Q1 case is far less likely than theatrical reporting. All we need to see this is to substitute “shorthand report of performance” (a la John of Bordeaux) for “whole-cast dictation” in the following Pechter criticisms (120-22). That will show how stepping away from foul papers to test alternatives can work.

 

1) “McMillin himself acknowledges one [unlikely element]: ‘I do not think scribes would have preferred working this way. They were trained to copy from manuscript.’”

 

Dictation is what stenographers are all about.

 

2) “What about the actors’ preferences”?

 

They would hate it, of course. No money, no horseplay, no breaks, identifying their characters (for which there is no tell-tale sign), etc. All theatrical reporting needs is a handy performance--what actors did.

 

3) “If Q1 Othello is not [a bad quarto] or pirated text . . . why didn’t the actors use [a scribal copy]”?

 

A dictated text in print is a bad quarto and probably pirated. Otherwise this is a good question. Copying good text is preferable in every way but Blackbeard’s. But for the artisan pirate the potential is good pay.

 

4) “McMillin’s scenario asks us to believe that the company lost all the transcripts ever in its possession—the author’s first draft, the fair copy, the prompt books produced for previous revivals, even the copy licensed for the Master of the Revels . . .”

 

Pechter assumes (believes, actually) that the company kept numerous play copies but that begs all the questions. Alternatively, transcriptions meant nothing to a stenographer who was in the business of making his own copies, just like the camera-toting dude at the movie premier.

 

5) “Editors conclude that the scribe who prepared the text for the Folio had access to an independent . . . copy: what was . . . lost was . . . found.”

 

And yet much of the mystery revolves around the differences between Q1 and F. If Q1 is a report it is no surprise that a copy independent from the report was ultimately available; that happened time and again. In that case there’s no mystery, except in the details.

 

6) “McMillin . . . summons up his own ‘fictions . . . to suit the changing needs of a hypothesis for which there is no documentary evidence in the first place.’”

 

Neither McMillin nor Pechter consider shorthand reporting, for which there is considerable evidence. The reporting of sermons is not denied; Heywood and Buc vouch for shorthand; but the best evidence is the manuscript playtext John of Bordeaux, inarguably transcribed from a phonetic shorthand report of performance (I say “inarguably” because no one currently argues against it).

 

7) “The issue, then, comes down to how much mediation exists—how many transcriptions intervene—between the author’s draft and the text we have . . .”

 

Between bad and good quartos and between Q1 and F Othello, “how many transcripts” won’t account for the variants. We have to ask how the text is transmitted. Pechter repeatedly asserts (and seems to take comfort from) his belief that the evidence can never get us anywhere: “Both New Bibliographers and New Textualists [Werstine & McMillin] . . . make do with what they’ve got—‘circumstantial’ rather than ‘veridical evidence’ . . .” (124). I don’t agree; good evidence has been there all along that had not been properly examined.

 

8) Pechter first quotes H. R. Woudhuysen on McMillin’s dictation hypothesis: “If this practice went on often, its effect on theories about the copy-text for printed plays would be devastating”; he then adds,

 

> “Much virtue in ‘if’; although nothing corresponding

> to this practice ‘has been identified’ in any single

> instance, McMillin is undeterred from his ‘impression’

> that this procedure occurred not just once but ‘rather

> often.’ This is the New Textualism working to catch

> sight of its desired objects, manuscripts proliferating

> in such abundance that any putatively Shakespearean

> draft is bound to be lost in the shuffle” (124).

 

I don’t know that “devastating” is exactly the word for discovering the truth--at least not for everyone; but I think shorthand reporting occurred a lot. John of Bordeaux corresponds so closely to the concept that it demonstrates aspects of the practice that hadn’t been suspected (that is, before shorthand was dismissed as a method of transmission). The evidence is strong and of different kinds, such that this single instance in manuscript suggests theatrical reporting was widespread. The scribe achieved his aim; presumably he (and others) could do it again. This is borne out by many bad quartos.

 

One of the most telling features of Bordeaux is its obvious accuracy, both phonetically and verbally. (The nature of the accuracy adds to the case; the play is not merely a transcription). The performance itself is often faulty, but that isn’t the reporter’s fault. He could have recorded the rare perfect performance; might a stenographer then have reported the play that became Q1 Othello? That could at once explain many of the differences between Q & F, just as shorthand explains bad quartos.

 

Bordeaux is (no doubt) a stolen text in preparation for production (with “signs of foul papers,” no less). It was valuable property not just to the players, but to a stenographer, whose compensation surely motivated a few hour’s work (if not countless hours of training). Pechter cites Peter Blayney (as have others) to downgrade the printed play as a valuable commodity. But the hard fact is that many plays were purchased and published to make money. Some of them are memorial reports, and bad ones at that. Even so, a shorthand reporter would have been paid relatively well for his piracy.

 

The method of transmitting Bordeaux is clear. The play isn’t one of my desired objects, that’s for sure, and there’s no “putative authorial draft” to lose. Because McMillin approached a theatrical reporting solution without sufficiently noting Bordeaux I can better appreciate his scholarly attitude; he was following the evidence and he was getting warm.

 

One of Pechter’s techniques when confronted with terms of criticism of the New Bibliography is to reverse the charges: binary, wishful thinking, imaginary, a priori? The same to you.

 

I think this argumentation fails on Bordeaux. In Werstine’s interesting “Appendix A,” Characteristics of Gregian “foul papers” in playhouse texts (whereby texts have been “identified” as authorial drafts in the past), Bordeaux has many, if not the most, entries in more categories than other texts. It is listed as by an “apparently non-theatrical scribe,” or one whose activity ended with his initial transcription; the scribe is not the author, despite contributing mightily to the lists. What mountains of evidence show is not politics, desire, binary, foul papers, imaginary, a priori, or other distractions. It’s a shorthand report of a performance; not how someone dreams it was done, but how it was done. It explains bad quartos and some of the good ones. That’s why it has elicited so much comment. Besides mine, it’s true, there’s only “this is too long.”

 

Gerald E. Downs

 
 
Q: Kent’s Character

 

The Shakespeare Conference: SHK 24.0208  Saturday, 4 May 2013

 

From:        Jack Heller < This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it >

Date:         April 27, 2013 9:35:57 AM EDT

Subject:     Q: Kent’s Character

 

We really are down a hole with no bottom in the “Businessman” thread. As far as I’m concerned, it has become a thread on the forbidden topic . . . which I’d prefer to be forbidden (though I always appreciate it when Peter Holland calls silliness by its name).

 

So we need a new topic, and let that be Kent in King Lear. In my latest reading of the play, Kent has dropped in my estimation. Some of his treatment of Oswald seems appropriate, in 1.4, but what about in 2.2? I’ve generally treated Kent as one of the moral cores of the play, but I’m concluding now that Kent, too, has some things to learn. What has been some good scholarship/criticism examining his character?

 

Jack Heller

 
<< Start < Prev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Next > End >>

Page 9 of 10

©2011 Hardy Cook. All rights reserved.